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Abstract 
The northern coast of Valencia, previously left out of the development of mass 
tourism, hoped to join the manna that had arrived with the construction boom of 
1996 to 2007 in Spain. Along with the desire to overcome the hurdle of 
seasonality, the construction, which has become known as Golf Resorts, began to 
take place. We will study the role played by what is called “hyper planning” 
(extremely oversized proposals) and the role of Public Administration in giving 
support to those operations in order to explain why none of them has successfully 
been finished. 
Keywords: construction bubble, planning, golf resorts, ecological impact, scarce 
resources. 
1 Introduction: the cycle of construction hyper-production 
From 1996 an unparalleled construction bubble was unleashed in the Spanish State 
only to abruptly burst in 2007 with the mortgage subprime crisis. Although the 
focus of this paper is not to analyse the causes of this phenomenon, on which there 
is abundant analysis, [1], we must indicate briefly that this emergence was made 
possible through the combination of very diverse reasons: economic, social, 
political, policy, including the hypertrophy of the construction sector itself, and 
especially the availability of cheap and abundant funding. However, few studies 
have considered the role played by urban planning with their oversized proposals. 
The aim of this present work is to highlight the contribution of urban planning to 
the real estate tsunami of the northern coast of Valencia. In particular we will study 
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a specific type of development known as Golf Resorts, a combination of a golf 
course and a residential area of high density. These operations have an impact on 
those semiarid and very vulnerable lands that we cannot afford. 
 
2 The last frontier, the northern coast of Valencia: Orange 
Blossom Coast 
The northern coast of Valencia comprises 16 municipalities with just 378,000 
registered inhabitants (2011), of which almost half live in the capital of 
“administrative province”, a sparsely populated region with a low density (91.1 
inhabitants/km2), whose coast (161.7 km. out of a total of 644) is also the least 
urbanized [2]. This area has remained outside the phenomenon of European mass 
tourism. The only exception is that of Benicàssim, a destination mostly occupied 
by domestic and even local tourism. 
     To overcome this situation of stunted development, the label “Costa del 
Azahar”, The Orange Blossom Coast, was launched. However, its impact has been 
very limited, despite the fact that out of the 16 coastal municipalities all but La 
Llosa (the smallest one with just 951 inhabitants) were declared “Tourist Towns” 
[3]. We will not examine the reasons for this backwardness, but we must 
emphasize that until the outbreak of the housing bubble this area had a sagging 
tourism development. With the construction boom, it seemed that its hour had 
finally arrived, but the proposals made for this last frontier can only be described 
as excessive, a sample of hyper-planning: “Regardless of the political colour of 
the municipalities, from south to north, different companies have presented PAI 
(the legal instrument equivalent to detailed plan) to develop between 35 and 40 
million square meters, with the construction of 12 new golf courses in addition to 
the three existing ones, and that will entail the construction of 40,000 new homes. 
Environmental experts have warned about the impact of these projects” [4]. 
 
2.1 Golf as an alternative to the problem of seasonality of tourism 
In Valencia, as in the whole Spanish State, tourism is a central economic activity. 
To give an idea and summarily illustrate its importance, in 2012 it accounted for 
10.9% of GDP and employing 11.9% of the workforce [5]. Yet it has a serious and 
unsolved problem: seasonality, linked to what is known as the “sun and beach” 
tourism. This dominant model coexists with others: inland, nature, congress and 
tourism, but they represent a small minority. To try to overcome the problem of 
seasonality, one alternative has been proposed: to promote golf. In the “prodigious 
decade” golf was presented as the ultimate solution, to avoid seasonality and 
combine tourism with the real estate boom: tourism, golf and brick all together. 
This proliferation of project of golf courses, always combined with a residential 
area, formed this typology and is identified as the Golf Resort. 
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2.2 Golf on Mediterranean, semi-arid climate 
Golf is not a suitable sport for an ecosystem such as the Mediterranean one, a semi-
arid coastal territory, with annual average rainfall that was in 2003 of 388 mm. [6]. 
To have a comparative idea, we must point out that the Cantabrian coastline 
exceeds 2,000 mm annually [7] and in what we could identify as the “European 
Golf” territory, is at least twice [8]. 
     Water is the great handicap for golf in an environment such as the 
Mediterranean seaside, where it is a scarce resource. This sport requires conditions 
that do not exist in an ecosystem such as the Valencia coast. Its huge areas of 
prairies are conditioned by a critical factor: irrigation. How much water does a 
golf course situated in northern coast of Valencia needs? The estimates vary 
considerably. “Ecologists in Action” estimates an average annual consumption of 
10,000 m3/hectare, the equivalent of a town of 8,000 inhabitants [9]. 
WWF/ADENA increases it to 12,000, while Greenpeace raises it to 15,000. The 
total consumption of the 380 existing golf courses in the whole State in 2013 
would stand for 14 million m3, i.e. the equivalent need of a population of 4 million 
people [10]. Along with the pressure on water resources, there exists other equally 
not negligible impacts on the construction of a golf course: the occupation of 
between 60 and 100 hectares (for an 18 holes course), the removal all the original 
vegetation (shrub, tree and herbaceous) after application of a plough of about  
30 cm deep and the introduction of alien species; the strong impact on the fauna, 
flora, landscape, soil, runoff; the loss of biological connectors and corridors 
between natural areas; groundwater contamination; human pressure coming from 
increased traffic, noise; the massive use of pesticides and fertilizers. Without 
ignoring that despite what is stated by law, the use of treated water for irrigation 
instead of recycled sewage waters is widespread. A sport that has been justified 
by reclaiming the breaking of seasonality problem, the generation of revenues 
from elite tourism, but as it has been proved, the golf itself is not profitable; to 
make it economically viable it has been invariably accompanied by a real estate 
development: the Golf Resort [11]. 
2.3 Golf Resorts on the prodigious decade 
Throughout Valencia there are in currently a total of 36 golf courses in operation, 
of which only three are in the northern region. All three were developed before the 
last real estate boom; the oldest one is the Club de Golf Costa Azahar. It opened 
in 1960, an almost urban club, just 6 km away from the centre of Castelló. It is a 
small course with nine holes, intended for a local user, nothing to compete with 
the Golf Resort model. For foreign tourism and as an integrated Golf Resort, only 
the Panorama Sant Jordi Golf can be taken into account, opened in 1995, with 18 
holes (80 hectares) it was designed by Bernhard Langer. Situated in between is the 
Club de Campo Mediterráneo Golf in Borriol with 18 holes, dating from 1978. 
     But when the building frenzy broke out, projects for Golf Resorts arose 
everywhere. The Association of Golf Courses of Castelló added to the other five 
to the existing three on the project: the Benicàssim Golf (to be opened in 2008–
2009), the Doña Blanca Golf (2008–2009), Sant Gregori (2008–2009), Xilxes 
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Golf (2009–2010) and finally the Marina d’Or Golf with undated scheduled 
inauguration. Not one of these projects has been successfully completed. 
2.4 Stages in the process of construction or space n build 
Since the passing of the Urban Activity Regulatory Law (LRAU) in 1994, all 
development plans of a certain magnitude must be carried out by processing an 
instrument called PAI (Integrated Action Program). In its processing four stages 
can be distinguished: planning, management, urbanization and building. The first 
one just requires the approval of planning documents, but does not involve any 
physical transformation of the ground, nor of the legal structure of land ownership. 
In the management phase (usually by rearranging plots, or by expropriation) there 
are changes in the legal structure of the allotments, although no physical alteration 
of the land. In the third one, with the implementation of the development, physical 
reality is altered, soil, landscape are transformed. The result of this process is to 
obtain plots that are now legally available for building. In the last one, the physical 
process of constructing the resort community is concluded with the building under 
the conditions established in the plan. This distinction in stages is extremely 
important from both an economic and a legal point of view. The first two (planning 
and management) require minimal investment from developers, making sense to 
the fact that they are eager to push through these plans even in circumstances of 
crisis, because they may consolidate rights so that their initiatives acquire a certain 
degree of legal irreversibility. The turning point from an economic point of view 
comes with works of urbanization. There the promoter must make investments that 
by far exceed those required at the “paper” stages of this phase. As we will see, 
this is where projects are stalled when confronted with a depressed economic 
cycle. 
3 Study cases 
3.1 Golf Sant Gregori (Borriana): do not count your chickens before they 
are hatched 
The plan for Golf Sant Gregori in Borriana covers a total area of 255 hectares, 
which includes a golf course of 73 hectares, a future extension to another one (Sant 
Gregori II), a residential resort with 6,000 homes and a marina (Santa Barbara), 
affecting some 30 hectares. This land is protected in the EU Natura 2000 Network, 
from the mouth of the Millars River to the natural spot of the Clot de la Mare de 
Deu. It is a disproportionate, excessive project, with an initial budget 105 million 
euros [12]. 
     Although in 2000 the initial proposals had already been submitted, we can 
consider that the project actually begins on the 17th of January 2005 with the 
approval of the plan for the area (Sector SUR-T-1) and with the simultaneous 
granting of the concession to urbanize to the company “Gestión y Construcción de 
Obras Públicas”, despite the fact that in October that corporation did transfers its 
rights to another one, “Urbanización Golf Sant Gregori”, a pool of the largest local 
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construction enterprises (GyC, Ballester and Lubasa). In late 2006 the urban plan 
had already been approved. Everything was ready for the launching of the works, 
and in fact in 2007, a promotional video painted a picture without any shadow of 
doubt; idyllic, a reliable business, a scenario of progress and social welfare [13]. 
But coinciding with the bursting of the construction bubble procedures underwent 
an abrupt stop. Until 2010 the rearranging of plots into a new land subdivision will 
be not resolved, to be finally enrolled in Public Register the following year, in an 
atmosphere of unbridled euphoria, fed from official sources, with forceful 
statements such as that “this new thrust to the Sant Gregori PAI places Borriana, 
along with Torreblanca Doña Blanca Golf PAI, at the forefront of the development 
of large residential and tourist projects in the province of Castellon. Only two PAI 
are currently following their normal processing and are in such an advanced 
point” [14]. 
     But the reality was quite different, and in early 2012 some owners, mainly 
minority shareholders, claiming the context of crisis, requested the temporary 
suspension of the project [15]. Seizures began for those who could not face the 
first instalment of urbanization works, and even the City Council having 
difficulties to meet that payment was forced to put for sale two of its plots [16]. 
Nevertheless, Bankia who had become the main partner through having to 
foreclose on the part of the developer (Golf Sant Gregori SA) continues in 
September 2012 to publicly express their willingness to maintain and continue the 
project. This is quite a surprising standing since the same entity had withdrawn 
simultaneously from other, the Doña Blanca Golf de Torreblanca, in which it was 
also involved [17]. Useless statements that do not prevent that in mid-2014 
difficulties could be concealed and that the bank, nationalized and bailed since 
May 2012, and owning nearly 69% of the shares of the project, formalized before 
the City Council a request for suspension of two years for the operation, and the 
return or reduction of the guarantee, even though the latter appeal was denied [18]. 
     Why did the project stop and fail? There are a variety of reasons: financial 
difficulties, the bursting of the housing bubble, its slow processing, and a late start 
in 2005. It should be highlighted that the role played by civic and social opposition, 
especially from ecologists groups. Indeed the project occupies a very sensitive and 
valuable area from an ecological point of view (from El Clot de la Mare de Deu 
the mouth of the Millars). In view of the failure of the operation, the environmental 
association GECEN (Grup per a l’Estudi i Conservació dels Espais Naturals) 
requests on the 17th of May 2014 to disqualify the area as developable land and its 
regeneration [19]. But, against all odds, the municipal government, adopting a 
stubborn attitude did not withdraw the initiative. And that’s it; today the project 
has no viability at all. In the meantime, the search for new international investors, 
“Two investment groups interested in Golf Sant Gregori” [20] groups which 
finally did not appear, and after twelve years of negotiation, the 27th of December 
2012, the majority shareholder (Bankia) transferred the ownership and the 
management of the operation to SAREB [21], widely and better known as the “Bad 
Bank”. SAREB (Acronym in Castilian for Management Company for Assets 
Arising from the Banking Sector Reorganisation) is a joint company, public (45%) 
– private (55%), founded in November 2012, during the bailing of financial 
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institutions, in order to help clean-up the Spanish banking sector and, more 
specifically, the banks with problems due to their over exposure to the real estate 
sector. SAREB has finally received the so called “toxic” real estate assets, without 
any chance in normal market. Financial institutions that had assumed them as a 
result of foreclosures transfer them to the SAREB who proceeds to its liquidation, 
avoiding bankruptcy of the former banks, but assuming losses which funded at 
45% from by public budgets. This move was a foretaste of its inevitable 
liquidation, in which again losses will be largely assumed by a public entity, as 
well as the original minority landowners who embarked on a speculative venture 
doomed to failure. End to a chimera that should never have risen. 
3.2 Doña Blanca Golf (Torreblanca): the milkmaid and her pail 
The project to build a resort with golf course in the municipality of Torreblanca, 
known and advertised as “Doña Blanca Golf” administratively starts on the 16th of 
May 2003 with the approval of a Plan that covers the sectors IV, VII, VIII, IX and 
X, and the grant of the concession to urbanize to the company “Urbanizadora 
Torremar SA.” We are dealing with a macro project for a municipality whose 
population in that year was only of 5,238 inhabitants, and where according to the 
2001 Census there were 3,679 dwellings (1,802 primaries, 1,222 secondary and 
616 empty ones). The figures speak for themselves in their excesses: a total of 191 
hectares located on the coast, invading again land of high ecological value, with 
the inevitable golf 60 hectares (described as the “green lung”) and 4,319 homes 
(245 single family homes, 106 bungalows and 3936 apartments) plus 3 hotels, 
shopping malls, sports facilities and green areas, with an initial budget that 
exceeded 52 million euros [22]. 
     To ease the processing, and thus give a better legal coverage, all political parties 
unanimously approved a new Master Plan in 2009 [23]. With the housing bubble 
already burst, a significant and revealing fact of social consensus that such 
operations got in the middle of the brick fever even afterwards. Against all logic, 
the chimera did continue, supported by the Provincial Government who 
generously funded in February 2011 a stand at the MIPIM, Cannes real estate fair, 
seeking international investors [24]. Its President had to recognize and affirm that 
if there are no investors who can promote our projects we have to go and look for 
them wherever they are. Simultaneously, in an exercise of foolishness extolled to 
the press continued to maintain that if all deadlines are accomplished, before the 
end of this year the machines could start to work (...) Torreblanca strengthens its 
commitment to implementation of this flagship project that also would be the first 
to be built in the province since 1995, when a golf course opened Sant Jordi. In 
September 2011 the deadline for submission of applications to execute the works 
of urbanization was opened [25] and in June 2012 the work is awarded to a joint 
venture company made up by Renos and Pavasal [26]. But just three months after 
the developer controlled now by Bankia (who, as in the case of Sant Gregori, again 
had to seize and substitute the original developer) requested suspension for two 
years [27]. To enmesh even more all the process, in May 2013 the City 
Government had to cancel the concession of the works when the existence of 
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commercial links between the developer and the builder were proved, something 
that prohibited by law [28]. 
     At all costs and against all logic, the Torremar developer (with now Bankia 
acting as the majority shareholder) tried to pressure the City Council to continue 
backing the operation, but finally it was the concessionaire itself who in February 
2014 did notify to the municipal government its willingness to abandon the project 
[29], including a bizarre proposal to let the local authorities themselves becomes 
the developer, and run the project [30]. But it was not a toll free proposal, an act 
of atonement for the excesses committed, but rather of a poisoned present, since 
the assignment included a clause by which the company recovered the deposit of 
over 8 million euros that for legal reasons had been previously deposited [31]. 
Forced by circumstances, the City Council in July 2014 cancelled the concession 
[32]. And again the story is over: the project stalled, the concession annulled, while 
environmental groups claim the cancellation of the whole project [33], and the 
owners, both Bankia and the small landowners facing losses from a grandiose 
project that should never have been started. This retells the story of milkmaid: the 
jar is broken and the milk poured. 
3.3 Marina d’Or Golf: the bigger they come, the harder they fall 
The project for Marina d’Or Golf, also known as Mundo Ilusión (World Illusion), 
is the most ambitious of all Golf Resort that have arisen in Valencia, pure hubris: 
no less than 1800 hectares, 7 large themed hotels (400–660 bedrooms), 3 golf 
courses (one designed by Greg Norman, another by Sergio Garcia and a 9-hole 
golf school course), shopping areas, dining and entertainment, the largest spa in 
Europe, a ski track, an artificial beach, all set to recreate different parts of the 
world; in short 55,806 hotel rooms and 33,000 tourist homes. A “Holiday City”, 
as its promoters have labelled, for 220,000 inhabitants, which would make it the 
fourth largest city in Valencia. Everything begins in the eighties when his 
promoter, Jesus Ger, finds one of the few pieces of unspoilt coastline left in the 
northern counties, and develops some small real estate operation, a prelude of 
things to come after the construction boom. The existing resort of Marina d’Or 
consists of five hotels, about 15,000 apartments, holiday parks, a spa, over twenty 
restaurants, themed events built north of the town of Orpesa, on the beach on a 
strip less than a mile wide between the railway coast and the coast, land that was 
considered as developable in the eighties. A preview of what was going to be 
Mundo Ilusión, sharing the same strategy: to overcome seasonality, the Achilles 
heel of the sun and beach tourism, by means of a wide range of leisure offer (spas, 
golf, skiing, and theme parks). 
     This mega-operation overflows the municipal boundaries of Orpesa extending 
into the adjacent Cabanes. From an Administrative point of view the Plan (PAI) 
began in 2005, but its final approval by the Autonomous Government of Valencia 
did not come until April 2010, amid numerous social and legal disputes, and 
various delays. Late and ephemeral approval resulting from the housing and 
economic crisis took its toll on the group. Soon after, in May 2011, the developer 
was declared insolvent and the entire operation paralyzed. But unlike the two 
previous golf resorts, this initiative has not finished in the hands of a financial 
Ecosystems and Sustainable Development X  213
 
 www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3541 (on-line) 
WIT Transactions on Ecology and The Environment, Vol 192, © 2015 WIT Press
entity or transferred to SAREB and is now in a kind of frozen state, a latent or 
dormant threat. 
4 By way of conclusion: a house of cards 
Not a single Golf Resort proposed in the northern regions of Valencia has been 
completed. Throughout the text we have seen the reasons for those failures. We 
shall now highlight the costs and impacts of these failed endeavours. 
     The ecological impact. The Golf Resorts reflect an unsustainable pattern of 
consumption of resources (especially water), an unfeasible option, unnecessary, 
with unacceptable environmental costs. 
     Urban planning, far from protecting and preserving the environment, the 
landscape and the territory has contributed, in no small measure, to feed the 
construction bubble, being largely responsible for what happened, and its own 
discredit (the so-called wild Urbanism) 
     Political costs: Public Administration has been serving the interests and 
preferences of the promoters (Urbanism à la carte) forgetting and ignoring its 
main mission: to improve the lives of citizens. 
     Economic costs: a large proportion of failed projects have ended up in the hands 
of the SAREB. This implies that they will be sold off or liquidated at public 
expenses, but economic losses not only affect the Public Administration, or the 
construction companies. They have also cause harm to many smallholders who 
were dragged to a non-existing “Dorado.” 
     Future strategies: local councils (and a part of the society that supports them) 
seem not to have learned the lesson, and they continue to bet on what we call the 
boa strategy; wait and see, until digestion occurs, until the huge stock of buildings 
and urbanized land is sold, to resume business as usual. Absurd and 
disproportionate projects, guided by the myth of growth are nowadays simply 
frozen, waiting for better times, but have not been formally abandoned, cancelled 
for good, forever and ever. 
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